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Mario Consuegra∗ Rajnish Kumar† Giri Narasimhan∗‡
September 3, 2013
Abstract
We prove with the help of a counterexample that Lemma 6 and Corollary 7 from Eeckhout [1] are incorrect.
Theorem 1 in Eeckhout [1] provides the following sufficient condition for the existence of unique stable matchings.
Condition 1 There exists an ordering of the set of females F = (Xi) and an ordering of the set of males M = (xi) such
that the preference profile satisfies
∀Xi ∈ F : xi Xi xj ,∀j > i, and
∀xi ∈M : Xi xi Xj ,∀j > i
It is claimed in Eeckhout [1] that Condition 1 is also necessary for uniqueness of stable matchings when N ≤ 6. We
observe here that although the claim holds for N = 4 (Lemma 5 ), it is incorrect for the case N = 6 (Lemma 6 ).
Claim 2 There exists a matching problem (F ,M,) with |N | = 6 where the set of stable marriages S is a singleton and
the preference profile does not satisfy Condition 1.
Proof. Consider the matching problem (F ,M,) with the following preference lists:
(a, b, c)A, (b, a, c)B , (a, b, c)C(B,A,C)a, (A,C,B)b, (A,C,B)c
The only stable matching µ∗ for (F ,M,) is given by µ∗(A,B,C) = (b, a, c). This is easily verified using the Gale-Shapley
algorithm by observing that the male and female optimal solutions are identical. However, one can confirm that it does not
satisfy Condition 1 by considering all possible orderings of F and M. An easier way to see that Condition 1 is not satisfied
is by observing that none of the females get their top preference in the only stable matching. Therefore, none of the females
can be first in the ordering (Xi) from Condition 1. Furthermore, there also exists a ring (A, a,B, b) which, together with
Lemma 2 from [1], shows that Condition 1 cannot be satisfied for this example.
The proof of Lemma 6 in Eeckhout [1] argued that if Condition 1 is violated then either µ∗ is not an equilibrium or
there exists µ′ 6= µ∗ that is also an equilibrium. The author’s statement that if b A a and/or B a A and the remaining
conditions of Condition 1 hold then µ′(A,B,C) = (b, a, c) ∈ S, is not true. Consider, for example, the following preference
lists: (b, a, c)A, (b, c, a)B , (a, b, c)C ; (A,B,C)a, (B,C,A)b, (A,C,B)c. Clearly, we have b A a and all other conditions of
Condition 1 are satisfied. However, µ′(A,B,C) = (b, a, c) /∈ S. Indeed one can easliy check that {B, b} blocks µ′.
Remark 3 Since none of females get their most preferred partners in the only stable matching in the example provided above,
it is clear that Corollary 7 in Eeckhout [1] is also incorrect.
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